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The unemployment insurance (UI) system in China has undergone a significant 
transformation over the past two decades. When China first introduced such a system in 
1986, it differed considerably from those in most other countries. At that time, the 
Chinese system provided income and other support to redundant workers through their 
former employers, the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Welfare of workers was 
considered to be the responsibility of SOEs, and therefore workers were not required to 
pay contributions. As subsequent economic reforms ended the requirement that SOEs take 
care of their former workers, the UI system was modified accordingly. By 1999, when the 
latest UI guidelines were introduced, the features of the Chinese system had become 
much more similar to those found in other countries. The current system aims to provide a 
basic level of income protection to the unemployed as well as help them gain new 
employment through related active labor market programs. 
Under increasing pressure to provide support to a larger number of workers, the 
UI system now faces a number of important policy dilemmas and challenges. The level of 
benefits remains quite low and provides a much lower income replacement rate than other 
countries. For educated and more capable workers who have easier access to jobs, the fast 
growth of the economy therefore provides an equally or even more important type of 
insurance than the UI program. The improved financial situation of the UI program has 
raised questions about how the program should be financed and how the surplus funds 
should be utilized, while in many areas of the country, enforcement in collecting 
contributions and determining benefits eligibility has been weak. Questions have also 
been raised regarding the possibility of extending coverage to rural and informal sector   
workers, the extent to which “hidden employment” of beneficiaries working in the 
informal sector should be addressed, and the effectiveness of accompanying active labor 
market programs.   
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The objective of this policy note is to assist the Chinese government in assessing 
implementation of the UI program to date, identifying key challenges, and exploring 
possible policy responses.
1 The note begins with a background section on recent 
developments in the country’s economy and labor market and briefly describes the 
evolution of the UI program within this context. The note then provides an overview and 
analysis of the current UI program, touching upon critical issues such as coverage, benefit 
levels, effects on work incentives, provision of employment services, and financial 
performance. For this analysis, the note draws upon results from recent UI policy 
simulation pilots in Qingdao and Tianjin; lessons from a World Bank-supported UI 
technical assistance project in Liaoning province; interviews with government officials 
involved in UI; and various UI-related studies and project reports.
2  The note concludes 
with policy recommendations and suggests some future directions for UI system reform.         
2.  BACKGROUND 
As background for analyzing the Chinese UI system, this section provides the 
country context by reviewing its recent labor market developments and presenting the 
evolution of the UI system since its inception in 1986.   
2.1  Recent Labor Market Developments 
In recent years, dramatic economic changes in China have had a profound impact on the 
country’s labor market, affecting how, where, and by whom workers are employed. Underlying these 
changes has been the structural shift from a planned to market economy, which has given rise to new 
labor market phenomena such as unemployment and informal employment, which were unheard of in 
the past. The massive overhaul of the state and collective sectors has reduced the number of SOEs 
from 118,000 in 1995 to 50,000 in 2005 (Dong and Xu 2005), bringing a decrease in employment in 
these sectors from a peak of 145 million or 80% of total urban employment in 1995 to about 75 
million or 30% of total urban employment in 2005. The shedding of labor in the state sector has been 
accompanied by job creation in the private sector. Statistics indicate that in recent years, about 80-90% 
of laid-off workers joined private and small businesses or engaged in self-employment (Betcherman 
                                                        
  
1  This policy note has been prepared by the World Bank as part of a larger program to support labor market 
reform in China. The program consists of two parts: (i) a technical cooperation program with the 
government and (ii) World Bank labor market studies, including an overall synthesis report covering 
various labor market issues and policy notes on selected subjects. 
2 Liaoning province was a major industrial base for manufacturing enterprises that have become 
unprofitable, so its restructuring problems and unemployment levels are particularly severe compared to 
other areas, which is the reason that the province was selected for the national social security reform pilot in 
2000.  
and Blunch, 2006; Giles, Park, and Cai, 2006). In 2004, the private sector accounted for two-thirds of 
total urban employment and one-third of formal employment. Notably, the biggest expansion has taken 
place in the informal sector, which includes the self-employed, micro enterprises, short-term contract 
workers, home workers, and day laborers. Most jobs created by private and individual firms are 
informal jobs, such as daily work, hourly work, seasonal work, and temporary jobs. Although no 
official figures are available for the size of informal sector employment in urban China, the informal 
sector is estimated to comprise about one-half of total employment, as proxied by unaccounted 
workers (World Bank 2007c). Overall, informal employment, including the self-employed and 
non-registered employment, rose from 32 million in 1995 to 125 million or 47% of total urban 
employment by 2004.
3  
Another key development has been the growing importance of the urban labor 
market, particularly as the relaxation of restrictions on population movement has allowed 
rural workers to seek better employment opportunities in cities. Urban employment has 
grown by 3.2% per year on average from 1990 to 2005 (NBS 2005, 2006), while the 
share of agriculture in total employment has fallen continuously from 70% in 1978 to 
45% in 2005 and rural industry has stagnated. The employment situation also differs 
significantly across regions, with the coastal provinces—particularly where export zones 
were initially situated—enjoying 3-4% growth per year in non-agricultural employment, 
while the heavy industry hubs in the northeast have been hit hard by the recent 
restructuring and experienced declining employment. 
One striking feature of China’s labor market is that despite high urban 
employment growth, labor market indicators such as employment rates, labor force 
participation rates, and unemployment rates have been deteriorating for some time. As 
noted in World Bank (2007b), these indicators have been affected by the interaction of 
several factors, including demographic pressures, rural-urban migration, and initial 
conditions of high labor market participation. Official data show that for the past decade, 
growth in the urban working age population has been exceeding urban employment 
growth by a wide margin of about 2 percentage points, indicating that new jobs are not 
able to offset demographic pressures (NBS 2005). 
Labor force participation rates have declined from over 80% in 1996 to 71% in 
2005 (CASS 2005). World Bank (2007b) cites four reasons for this trend: the easing of 
                                                        
3    These workers, who are labeled as “missing workers” because they reflect differences in the number of 
workers reported through different statistical systems, include unreported urban workers and unregistered 
informal employment. Other methods and definitions, for example using lack of social security coverage or 
type of job as an indicator of informality, yield similar estimates. For further discussion, see Cai and Wang 
(2004), Du, Cai, and Wang (2006), and World Bank (2007c).  
employment to a more realistic level, following inflated labor force participation under 
central planning’s full employment policy; extensive use of early retirement as an 
instrument to relieve labor market pressures, particularly during the aggressive period of 
SOE restructuring which started in 1998; the discouraged worker effect, in which 
long-time unemployed, older, and unskilled workers lose faith in their employment 
prospects and withdraw from the labor force; and the increase in young Chinese who are 
taking up or prolonging their education. 
At the same time, China’s unemployment figures have been rising. Open 
unemployment emerged in the 1980s, when the government allowed some private 
initiative and gradually withdrew from direct labor allocation. The issue of 
unemployment finally gained prominence in the mid-1990s with the massive restructuring 
of SOEs and layoffs of 45 million workers.       
The official registered unemployment rate in China has increased steadily from 
2.9% in 1995 to 4.2% in 2005 (NBS 2005). However, unemployment in China is difficult 
to measure, particularly as official unemployment statistics are inconsistent with ILO 
definitions (Knight and Xue 2004). The actual unemployment rate is thought to be much 
higher than official figures indicate, as the official figures do not capture three additional 
sources of unemployment. First, the official unemployment rate does not include all 
individuals who have been laid off from SOEs and urban collectives, as many of them did 
not end their labor relationships with their former employers after they were transferred to 
the enterprise-based Re-employment Service Centers. These workers are classified as 
xiagang rather than as unemployed. Second, the figure does not include farm contract 
workers who migrated to cities but are actively looking for jobs. Third, it does not include 
young college and high school graduates who have been out of school for six months or 
less.
4  
                                                        
4 According to the MOLSS, recent graduates who are without work are classified as students for the first 
six months following graduation.    After six months, they are classified as unemployed.      
Despite the above caveats to unemployment figures, studies have shown an 
increase in unemployment rates. One analysis of survey data shows that an internationally 
comparable unemployment rate in urban areas, including all migrants, increased from 4% 
in 1995 to 7.3% in 2002 (Giles et al 2006). Unemployment in urban areas among 
permanent urban dwellers increased from 6.1% to 11.1% over the same period. Because 
unemployment among migrants is viewed as less of a problem as they usually self-select 
for jobs and often return to their rural villages when the labor market tightens, 
unemployment among permanent urban dwellers is viewed to be a more meaningful 
indicator (Fox and Zhao 2002). Since 2002, when the government curbed SOE 
restructuring and prioritized job creation, mass layoffs have ceased and the 
unemployment situation has stabilized. Table 1 presents the range of estimates for 
unemployment rates in China. 
] 
Table 1: Estimates of Urban Unemployment in China (%) 
 
 
In analyzing China’s labor market, it should be noted that national averages hide a 
high degree of variation across the country. Across regions, unemployment rates vary 
from 2% to 20%, and the level of urbanization ranges from 20% to 80%. Likewise, local 
policies and administrative capacities differ significantly. Each province is as large as 
some countries in the world, and labor markets even within individual regions and 
provinces can be very diverse. These differences, as well as the lack of access to reliable 
data, must therefore be taken into account in reviewing national-level statistics. 
Year  Registered 
unemployed 
From NBS labor 
force surveys 
From CULS - 
local  residents 
From CULS – 
local and 
migrants 
1995  2.9 4.0  6.1  4 
1996  3 3.9 6.8 4.5 
1997  3.1 4.5  7.7  5 
1998  3.1 6.3  8.5  5.6 
1999  3.1 5.9  9  5.9 
2000  3.1 7.6  10  6.5 
2001  3.6 5.6  10.8  7 
2002  4.0 6.1  11.1 7.3 
2003  4.3 6.0     
2004  4.2 5.8     
2005  4.2   6.7  4.4 
Source: China Labor Statistical Yearbook, 2005; Du, Cai, and Wang, 2006; Giles, Park, and Zhang, 2005; 
and World Bank (2007a). Presented in World Bank (2007b). 
  
2.2  Evolution of the UI Program 
China’s UI program has evolved significantly over the past 20 years through three 
major phases. The first phase began with the introduction of the UI system in 1986, with 
the promulgation of the “Interim Provisions on Workers’ Job-Waiting Insurance in 
State-Owned Enterprises.” At the time, the purpose of the UI program was to help 
facilitate economic reforms that would increase productivity and competitiveness, namely 
by giving SOEs autonomy in recruitment, adoption of labor contracts for all staff, and 
downsizing of redundant or unproductive staff. These reforms brought an end to lifetime 
employment security for SOE workers and were expected to result in a large increase in 
unemployment. The UI program was thus intended to serve as a social safety net, 
providing temporary income support and reemployment assistance to laid-off workers. 
Notably, the program covered only the SOE sector and was financed by employer 
contributions, interest earnings, and government subsidies, without any contributions 
from workers. Benefits were calculated using the individual worker’s average monthly 
wage and were paid out according to length of service and other criteria. 
Despite several changes to the UI framework, the role of the UI program remained 
limited during the first decade of implementation. The second phase of UI program 
development started with the adoption of the “Provisions for Workers’ Job-Waiting 
Insurance in State-Owned Enterprises” in 1993. The new provisions expanded UI 
coverage from four to seven categories of SOE workers and changed the basis on which 
benefits were determined. Benefits under the new provisions were calculated initially 
using the social relief payment levels stipulated by the local departments of social affairs, 
with UI benefits equal to approximately 120-150% of social relief payments. After the 
adoption of the new Labor Law in 1994 which specified a minimum wage, UI benefits 
were then calculated using the minimum wage, with benefits equal to about 70-80% of 
the regional minimum wage. Despite these changes, however, the impact of the UI system 
continued to be limited due in large part to the slow pace of SOE reform and low levels of 
unemployment. 
The acceleration of economic and corporate reforms brought a renewed focus on 
UI in the late 1990s. Mergers, liquidations, and streamlining of establishments were 
encouraged among SOEs. To deal with the large number of displaced workers, the 
government required that all SOEs establish Re-employment Service Centers to provide a  
transition for workers to move into other employment or the UI program. Under the 
Centers, retrenched workers remained the responsibility of their employing SOEs for up 
to three years, although other sources were also used to finance the program—the 
enterprise, the government, the UI Funds each contributed one-third of the funds. The 
workers received an allowance to meet minimum basic living standards, which were set 
in 1998 to be slightly higher than the local standards for unemployment relief. The 
Centers also paid premium contributions for social security benefit programs such as 
pension and health insurance, as well as covered expenditures for retraining. 
The introduction of the latest “Regulations on Unemployment Insurance” in 1999 
marked the beginning of the third and current phase of the UI program, under which the 
features of China’s UI system have become more similar to those found in other countries. 
For the first time, the reforms officially introduced the concepts of “unemployment” and 
“unemployment insurance,” replacing “job waiting” and “xiagang.”
5 Unlike previous 
policies, the regulations require UI contributions from both enterprises and individual 
workers, with any shortfalls to be filled by fiscal subsidies. Another significant change is 
the extension of UI program coverage beyond SOEs to include all urban workers, with 
the exception of civil servants. The regulations also move away from a unifying national 
UI standard to a more decentralized approach, allowing provinces to determine benefit 
levels, duration, and other aspects of the program according to the local situation. 
Additional details on the current UI system are provided in the following section. 
The most recent development related to UI was the adoption of the binggui policy 
in 2000. This policy shifted the burden of supporting retrenched workers away from 
SOEs by merging the Re-employment Service Centers with the UI program. Laid-off 
workers would no longer maintain a relationship with their former employers through the 
Centers but would instead be covered directly by the UI program. The first group of 
provinces to complete the binggui process were in the southeast—Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Fujian, and Shangdong. The centers in the 
northeastern province of Liaoning have also been completely closed. By the end of 2005, 
20 provinces had effectively completed binggui, and only about 200,000 people remained 
                                                        
5 The term “job waiters,” which was widely used in the late 1980s and early 1990s, differs from the term 
“unemployed” mainly because of its historic connotation. The term was first associated with young 
unemployed graduates who had gone to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution and who had, with 
the policy reform in 1978, returned to cities to look for jobs. As enterprise reforms took hold, many people 
were laid off by SOEs and urban collective corporations, and they were also officially called job waiters. 
The term xiagang refers to laid-off SOE workers who remain attached to their prior employer.    
in Re-employment Service Centers compared to a peak of 7.01 million in 1991.
6 Over  the 
same period, the number of people receiving UI increased from about 600,000 to 6.8 
million. With these changes, the UI program has slowly moved from serving as a 
transition measure for mass layoffs to becoming a regular UI program.     
3.    DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM   
As noted above, the current UI program is governed by a set of guidelines 
specified in the 1999 “Regulations on Unemployment Insurance” (State Council 
Ordinance #258-99). This section provides an overview of the main parameters of the UI 
system as outlined in the regulations then analyzes the key aspects of the performance of 
the system, stressing both income protection as well as efficiency aspects. 
3.1  Current Design of the UI Program 
Coverage 
The current UI program covers urban enterprises and institutional organizations 
and their employees, including self-employment.
7 The program does not cover civil 
servants or rural farmers and workers, with the exception of rural contract workers 
employed by urban enterprises. China’s system also does not cover some special groups 
such as school leavers, unlike some OECD and transition countries where such groups 
might receive reduced UI benefits (Vodopivec et al 2005). 
Level and Duration of Benefits 
Unlike in most other transition and OECD countries, UI benefits in China are not 
earnings-related (see the comparison of main UI parameters between China and other 
transition countries in Table 2). Instead, the UI program has a flat benefit level set by the 
local authorities, although regulations require that the level be higher than those used in 
minimum living standards schemes for urban residents but lower than the local minimum 
wage. Like other transition countries, China uses the benefit floor to ensure that the 
benefits of workers at the bottom of the wage distribution do not fall beneath an officially 
determined minimum. In some provinces, the level of benefits is linked to the length of 
UI contributions. For example, in Liaoning, workers with less than ten years of 
                                                        
6 Information provided by the Department of Unemployment Insurance, Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security. 
7 Urban enterprises are defined as SOEs, urban collective enterprises, foreign funded enterprises, urban 
private enterprises, and other urban enterprises.  
contributions receive 70% and those with more than ten years of contributions receive 
80% of the local minimum wage. Additional benefits include medical subsidies for those 
receiving UI cash allowances and minor benefits for survivors in the event of a 
beneficiary’s death, namely a funeral allowance and pension for the beneficiary’s spouse 
and dependents. The UI funds may also be used to subsidize vocational training and job 
matching services. 
The duration of benefits varies according to the applicant’s years of contribution. 
A person who has contributed for less than five years may receive benefits for up to 12 
months, a person who has contributed for five to ten years may receive benefits for up to 
18 months, and a person who has contributed for over ten years may receive benefits for 
up to 24 months. The UI system does not have a waiting period before benefits 
commence, so UI allowances are calculated from the date on which an individual 
registers for benefits. 
Benefits are paid monthly except to rural contracted employees recruited by urban 
enterprises, who are given a lump sum living allowance if they have had over one year of 
continuous service and their employers have paid the UI contribution. UI agencies deposit 
the benefit amounts in designated local banks, where beneficiaries can then access the 
funds using a deposit card. 
Eligibility 
Initial eligibility. To be eligible for benefits, an individual must: (i) have 
contributed to UI for at least one year, (ii) been separated from their employer 
involuntarily, and (iii) be registered as unemployed and willing to work. These eligibility 
requirements are similar to those found in the transition countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, where the unemployed must register at the local employment office and have 
worked in covered employment for at least 9-12 months within a reference period of 
12-36 months (Vodopivec et al 2005). In China, the employer must produce proof of 
termination for the unemployed, inform them of their right to UI benefits, and submit the 
names of the unemployed to the designated social insurance operation institutions within 
seven days from the date of termination. The unemployed individual registers for UI 
benefits by taking the proof of termination to the social insurance operation institution.   
Continuing eligibility. As in the European transition economies, continuing 
eligibility requires that UI beneficiaries be actively seeking, capable of, and available for  
work, as well as willing to accept suitable job offers. A beneficiary thus becomes 
ineligible for UI benefits under a number of conditions, such as gaining re-employment, 
being recruited into military services, emigrating to another country, and becoming 
eligible for basic old age pension. Benefits may also be terminated if an individual refuses 
to take jobs recommended by the designated local government authorities. If a worker is 
reemployed but then becomes unemployed again, he/she may be eligible for the 
uncollected benefit from the last period of unemployment. To meet eligibility 
requirements, beneficiaries must report monthly to the UI institutions regarding their job 
search efforts and job retraining participation. Those individuals who do not meet the 
reporting requirement lose their benefits for that month. 
Financing 
As in most OECD and other transition countries, responsibility for UI 
contributions in China is shared between employers, who contribute 2% of their total 
payroll, and employees, who contribute 1% of their wages. Only rural contracted 
employees recruited by urban enterprises and institutional organizations are exempt from 
paying UI contributions themselves. Contribution rates in OECD and transition countries 
vary significantly between countries, with the majority of countries having contribution 
rates around or below 3% and not all countries requiring employee contributions 
(Vodopivec 2004a). In the United States, employer contributions depend on the 
employer’s layoff experience—employers who lay off workers more frequently and thus 
impose heavier financial burdens on the system are assigned a higher rate.   
UI contributions by employers and workers are collected through a payroll 
deduction system in which the employer withholds the required percentage from the 
employees’ earnings. The UI premium paid by an enterprise is deducted on a monthly 
basis from its bank account before calculation and levy of the profit tax. Likewise, the UI 
premium paid by an individual is not counted as income and is therefore exempt from 
income  tax.   
Unless a provincial UI program faces a serious financial problem, the central 
government does not assume any financial responsibility for the UI program directly. 
Local governments cover the administrative costs of UI program operations but normally 
do not finance the UI program directly. For situations in which the UI fund is insufficient 
to pay out the current year’s expenditure, the regulations stipulate that the UI reserve fund  
accumulated from previous years, sale of government bonds, and UI pooled adjustment 
fund should be used to cover the deficit. Local government subsidies are to be used only 
as a last resort once the other three sources are depleted.   
Program Administration 
The labor and social security administrative department under the State Council oversees UI 
at the national level, but administration of the program is decentralized to social insurance operation 
institutions at the provincial and lower levels. Provincial institutions handle day-to-day responsibilities 
such as registering the unemployed, providing deposit cards for beneficiaries to access their benefits at 
the designated local banks, and allocating subsidies to vocational training and job placement services. 
UI offices at the city and local administrative levels are generally responsible for registering employers 
and employees in the program, maintaining records, receiving benefits claims, determining eligibility, 
and processing benefits. Contributions are levied by the local tax departments or social security 
agencies and deposited in special accounts opened in state commercial banks. The Finance 
Departments maintain and manage the UI funds. The costs of managing the UI program are financed 
by general government revenue, allocated by public finance authorities through a regular budget 
planning and allocation process, so no charges are made to the UI fund for administration. 
In terms of financial management, the local finance departments keep UI funds in 
special accounts that may not be diverted to other uses. UI funds can only be invested in 
government bonds and deposited in the bank. One notable requirement is that UI funds 
should be pooled at the municipal level in municipalities directly under the Central 
Government and in “cities with districts under them.” Provincial-level adjustment funds 
may also be collected by the transfer of 4% of all UI contributions within the province. 
These adjustment funds can then be used to supplement city or district pools that are 
experiencing a deficit.   
3.2  Key Issues Faced by the UI System 
To provide a broad picture of the functioning of the UI system, this section 
discusses the national-level statistics presented in Table 3. Given the decentralized nature 
of the UI system in China and the high degree of variation among provinces, this 
discussion is complemented by analysis of the UI system as it functions in selected 
provinces. 
Limited Program Coverage and Participation 
Despite extending the mandatory UI coverage beyond the SOE sector, the 
“Regulations on Unemployment Insurance” of 1999 have so far succeeded in bringing  
coverage only to less than half of the targeted population of urban workers. While the 
number of contributors increased from 98.5 million in 1999 to 106.5 million in 2005, the 
UI coverage rate (the proportion of workers enrolled in the program in total urban 
employment) declined steadily from 45% in 2000 to 39% in 2005 (Table 3). In 2005, UI 
coverage thus included only 14.1% of the total labor force. Rates in some areas of the 
country are estimated to be higher, such as in Tianjin municipality which reported a 
coverage rate of 97%, or about 40% of total employment in the entire municipality.
8 In 
other areas of the country, however, coverage rates are much lower.   
 
 
                                                        
8  Data presented in “The Simulations and Forecast on Unemployment Insurance in Tianjin” (2005).  
Table 1: National-level Statistics on Unemployment Insurance 
 
  1999 2000 2001  2002 2003 2004 2005
Participants at year-end (million)    98.5 104.1 103.5  101.8 103.7 105.8 106.5
Beneficiaries receiving the benefit at least part of 
the year (million)  2.7 3.3 4.7  6.6 7.4 7.5 6.8
Beneficiaries at the year end (million)  1.1 1.9 3.1  4.4 4.2 4.2 3.6
UI program coverage rate (%)*  44.0 45.0 43.3  41.1 40.5 40.0 39.0
UI program recipiency rate (%)** -- among 
















UI program recipiency rate (%)**-- among 
beneficiaries at the year end  19.0 31.7 45.6  57.1 52.5 50.6 42.9
UI benefit paid as percent of average wage    14.1 18.2 16.4  14.3 12.8 11.4 11.0
UI premium contribution (100 million)  115.5 152.1 178.1  202.4 233.1 270.8 n.a.
Revenue (100 million)  125.2 160.4 187.3  215.6 249.5 290.8 333.0
Expenditure (100 million)  91.6 123.4 156.6  186.6 199.8 211.3 207.0
UI Expenditure in the year (CNY100 million)  31.9 56.2 83.3  116.8 131.4 137.5 136.8
% of UI benefit allocated to ALMP  52.7 46.9 37.2  28.6 23.7 23.8 n.a.
Fund Balance (100 million)  159.9 195.9 226.2  253.8 303.5 385.8 511.0
UI spending as percent of social insurance fund 
expenditure 
4.3 5.2 5.7 5.4 5.0 4.6 3.8
 
Memorandum items   
Total Labor Force (million)  727.9 739.9 744.3  753.6 760.8 768.2 778.8
Total Employed (million)  713.9 720.9 730.3  737.4 744.3 752.0 758.3
Total Urban Employment (million)  224.1 231.5 239.4  247.8 256.4 264.8 273.3
Total Urban Unemployed (million)  5.8 6.0 6.8  7.7 8.0 8.3 8.4
Average Wage (yuan)  8346 9371 10870  12422 14040 16024 18364
 
* UI program coverage rate is the ratio of number of employees covered in the program to total urban employment. 
** UI program recipiency rate is the ratio of number of benefit recipients to the number of urban registered unemployed.   
n.a. -- Not available 
Source:  China  Labor  Statistical Yearbook 2000 – 2006, China Labor Statistical Yearbook 2006 & China Statistical Yearbook 2000-2006. 
It is important to note that the coverage of unemployment insurance is more 
prevalent among the richer segments of population. In a survey of five large and seven 
small cities, the proportion of workers in poor households (those with per capita incomes 
below the $2/day poverty line) being covered by the UI program was 17% and 24%, 
respectively, while the proportion of non-poor was 35% and 46%, respectively (Figure 1). 
The same survey estimated the proportion of workers being covered by UI program 
among the bottom quintile ranked by per capita household income to be 21% and 27%, 
respectively, for the five large and small cities and 42% and 60%, respectively, for the top 
quintile. Expanding coverage to workers without labor contracts as well as to migrant 
workers would thus help bring more equal income distribution.   
Figure 1: Coverage of Unemployment Insurance in Chinese Cities, by Poverty Status 



































Large cities Small cities
 
Notes:  The poor are defined as those with per capita incomes below $2 per day (in terms of 1993 PPP dollars). 
Source:  China Urban Labor Survey (2005) in Shanghai, Wuhan, Shenyang, Fuzhou, and 
Xian, and seven smaller cities in surrounding areas, presented in World Bank (2007a).  
 
Two factors may explain the low coverage. First, a large share of urban workers 
remains outside the system because UI coverage is limited to urban enterprises and 
institutions and thus fails to include informal sector workers (see above discussion on the 
estimates of informal sector employment). Second, as confirmed by two separate 
assessments of the UI system in Liaoning province, private sector coverage is poor also 
due to non-compliance by employers, partly in hiring workers without labor contracts 
(Chen 2004, Abrahart 2005).
9  
                                                        
9 Using data from the second round of the China Urban Labor Survey (CULS 2005), Du, Cai, and Wang 
(2006) find that 32.6% of native urban residents and 84.3% of migrants did not have formal labor contracts 
in 2005.  
It should be noted that in contrast to a mild increase in the number of UI 
contributors, the number of UI beneficiaries increased dramatically after 1999. The 
implementation of major SOE reforms—particularly the binggui policy, under which 
unemployed workers left the Re-employment Service Centers—increased the inflow into 
recipiency, and the number of UI beneficiaries jumped from 3.3 million in 2000 to 6.6 
million in 2002 (Table 3). This number reached a peak of 7.5 million in 2004, then 
dropped to 6.8 million in 2005. Demand for the UI program is expected to continue with 
the complete closure of the Reemployment Service Centers and with the expansion of the 
private sector, which is characterized by less stable employment relationships and hence 
higher turnover rates than the SOEs.   
Modest Levels and Relatively Long Potential Duration of Benefit 
As noted above, benefit levels are set by local authorities between the minimum 
living standards level and the minimum wage. Although UI benefits exceed the minimum 
subsistence level, the program provides only a very modest level of income protection to 
beneficiaries. Most provinces link UI benefit levels to the minimum wage, while some 
provinces link them to levels set by the minimum living standard guarantee (dibao) 
program, which is described below. At the national level, the China Labor Statistical 
Yearbook indicates that UI benefits paid as a percentage of average urban on-work wages 
have decreased continuously since 2000, from 18.2% to 11% in 2005 (Table 3). Assuming 
that the average wage of recipients before becoming unemployed amounted to 75% of the 
overall average wage, UI benefits provided a wage replacement rate of only 14.7% in 
2005. This replacement rate is much lower than those of developed countries and also 
other transition countries, where replacement rates typically range from 45% to 70% of 
average gross earnings (Vodopivec 2004a).         
If their household per capita incomes are still lower than the local minimum living 
standards while they are receiving UI benefits, unemployed workers can apply for the 
minimum living standard guarantee (dibao) program as urban residents. In principle, all 
residents with hukou and with income per capita less than a local dibao standard (“dibao 
line”) are eligible to receive cash transfers equal to the difference between the dibao line 
and that income per capita. In addition to cash and in-kind benefits, a dibao certificate 
often provides preferential access to certain social services, such as free or reduced-fee 
schooling, health care, utilities, and housing. By end of 2005, 22.3 million individuals (10  
million households) were covered under the dibao program, including 4.32 million 
xiagang workers and 4.01 million unemployed, which constituted the largest group (about 
38%) of dibao beneficiaries. During the same period, the number of UI beneficiaries 
nationwide was only 6.8 million.
10   
In terms of benefit duration, the maximum benefit period in China is quite long 
compared to other countries. Nearly all European transition countries have reduced the 
maximum potential benefit duration from the levels introduced at the inception of these 
programs in the early 1990s, typically to a 12-month period (Table 2; Vodopivec et al 
2005).  
Weak Eligibility Enforcement and Leakage of the System 
Although eligibility requirements have become more specific as the UI program 
has evolved, progress in enforcing these requirements has varied significantly across 
provinces. Enforcement has been more stringent in areas such as Shanghai, which uses 
advanced information systems to cross-check claims and undertakes regular auditing to 
reduce fraud. In most areas of the country, however, enforcement remains quite weak, 
particularly for municipalities with high levels of unemployment and low administrative 
capacity.  
The Liaoning study provides evidence of lax enforcement of both initial and 
continuing eligibility conditions (Chen 2004). The study found that although an 
individual must be registered with the employment service as a job seeker to be eligible 
for benefits, UI offices rarely require beneficiaries to provide proof of registration. The 
study identified other signs of weak enforcement of continuing eligibility conditions, such 
as the fact that UI recipients tend to collect UI benefits for the full benefit duration. 
Likewise, a study for Dalian City found that over 83% of UI recipients collected benefits 
for 18-24 months. According to Chen, a 2002 survey of 187 UI benefit recipients in 
Liaoning also revealed that 80% of UI recipients were working formally or informally 
while receiving UI benefits. 
To learn more about possible leakages and disincentive effects, an analysis of the 
exit patterns of UI program participants in Qingdao municipality was conducted for this 
policy note. The results are consistent with the findings above and show that (i) the 
probability of leaving unemployment is lower for recipients than for non-recipients of UI 
                                                        
10  Sources: China Statistical Yearbook 2006 & China Civil Affairs Statistical Communiqué 2006.  
benefits, (ii) longer potential durations are associated with longer survival in 
unemployment, and (iii) a large proportion of recipients exhibit substantial decline within 
the month of eligibility exhaustion or in the preceding month. While the first two results 
could be explained by differences in characteristics among the groups being compared, 
the large share of recipients leaving unemployment at the point of exhaustion of benefits 
is the strongest evidence about the waiting effects of the UI program. The survival 
function of the UI benefits recipients by potential benefit duration groups are presented in 
Figure 2, and the complete results of the analysis, including econometric estimates, are 
provided in Appendix 1.   
The Liaoning report cites the lack of operational guidelines for applying eligibility 
requirements as a constraint to enforcement in China. For example, in terms of ensuring 
the UI recipient’s attachment to the labor market, the requirement that beneficiaries 
cannot refuse jobs without “proper causes” does not specify what proper causes might be. 
No guidelines have been developed to help UI officers identify a set of questions to ask to 
determine continued eligibility. Furthermore, the Liaoning study found that UI offices are 
hindered by lack of information needed to determine continued eligibility. Job placement 
centers are unlikely to report job refusals to the UI benefit office since they are not 
required to collect such information, and no cross-checking is done to verify whether 
beneficiaries have become reemployed.   
Another reason for weak enforcement is the fact that when benefits are so low, UI 
officers may side with beneficiaries and tolerate “hidden employment”—registered 
xiagang or unemployed receiving basic living allowances and/or UI benefits and working 
at the same time. UI offices in different cities apply different standards for evaluating 
eligibility in light of such work, with some ignoring additional earnings if income earned 
is below minimum wage. This lax treatment may in turn increase the degree of hidden 
employment, as UI beneficiaries realize that the violation of continued eligibility 
requirements will not be penalized. Even in municipalities which attempt to enforce the 
requirements, hidden employment can be difficult to detect given its oftentimes informal 
and irregular nature. Various sources and survey results suggest that between 50-90% of 
the urban registered unemployed are engaged in hidden employment. A survey conducted 
in Tiexi district of Shenyang City in August 2002 found that 80% of UI recipients were 
working while receiving UI benefits (Chen 2004).   
  
Figure 2: Survival Function of the Unemployed who Registered at Qingdao 





















































0 5 10 15 20 25
Duration of Unemployment (months)
PBD = 3 PBD = 6 PBD = 9 PBD = 12
PBD = 15 PBD = 18 PBD = 24
 
 
Source:    Computations based on data Qingdao Employment Office data. 
Note:  The graph shows survival functions for benefit recipients, separately for those with 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, and 24 months of 
potential benefit duration. Kaplan-Meier survival functions are presented, showing the probability of being unemployed at a given 
duration of unemployment spell. 
 
Weak Labor Market Attachment of UI Beneficiaries 
Although UI policies recognize the value of labor market programs in promoting 
reemployment and allow for up to 10% of yearly UI expenditures to be used for job 
introduction services and vocational training for UI beneficiaries,
11  expenditures for such 
programs have generally been low. The UI system assessment of Liaoning found that in 
2004, expenditures on labor market programs fell to less than 4% throughout the province 
(Abrahart 2005). Chen (2004) points to low utilization of the UI program subsidy by 
employment service offices as one possible explanation for the limited use of 
employment services among UI recipients. Overall, the proportion of active labor market 
program expenditures is quite low in China, amounting to less than 0.4% of GDP. In 
contrast, most OECD countries have allocated approximately 2% of GDP to their labor 
market activities (Yang, 2005).       
                                                        
11  In 2006, a Government circular was issued on piloting an expansion of the scope of UI fund expenditures. 
The pilot, to be undertaken in seven provinces, would allow UI fund expenditures for vocational training, 
job introduction services, social insurance, interest deductions for microfinance, and other subsidies for UI 
beneficiaries.  
One World Bank study reviewed training provided in Shenyang and found that the 
average duration of courses was about one month, with emphasis on computer courses 
and cooking. The types of courses being undertaken suggest that trainees prefer to 
develop skills that will help build their potential for small business or self-employment. 
Consistent with state policy, the Liaoning provincial government has been supporting 
these efforts with small loans and exemptions from taxes and levies applying for small 
businesses. However, as the application procedure is too complicated and the amount of 
loans is too low to start small business, take-up of the loans has been limited to date. 
The incentives to maintain a connection to the labor market are thus quite low 
under the current UI scheme. In terms of continued eligibility requirements, the current 
UI regulations place greater emphasis on disqualifying events such as military service and 
emigration rather than on ensuring continued connection to the labor market. In contrast, 
other countries consider demonstrated attachment to the labor market to be a fundamental 
condition for continued eligibility. In some countries, registration with the employment 
service or employer contacts on a weekly basis is required as proof of continued 
attachment to the labor market. Transition countries such as Poland require that claimants 
be willing to participate in vocational training or public works programs. However, the UI 
program in China does not have such stringent requirements. In addition, UI offices do 
not have a mechanism by which to identify individuals who have nearly exhausted their 
benefits so that they can be given additional attention from employment services offices.   
Varying Financial Performance 
Thanks to strong economic growth, UI fund balances have improved significantly 
in recent years. Some UI funds were pushed into deficit after the adoption of binggui in 
2000, which sharply increased the number of unemployed and therefore the number of UI 
benefit recipients. Since then, almost all UI funds have recovered and are now enjoying 
surpluses. By the end of 2006, the overall surplus was nearly 72.5 billion yuan, and only 
Liaoning province was experiencing a deficit (China Labor Statistical Yearbook, 2007).   
However, it should be noted that the financial situation varies across provinces, with the 
coastal and southern areas enjoying greater surpluses. 
A number of factors could affect the financial sustainability of UI funds. Aside 
from the large number of eligible unemployed in some areas, the UI system is providing 
benefits to some individuals who should actually be ineligible because they do not meet  
the initial or continued eligibility requirements, as described above. In addition, 
contributions have been reported to be irregular in some areas, particularly for SOEs in 
arrears. Based on calculations of contributions and coverage rates, the level of compliance 
in Liaoning province has been estimated to be as low as 60% (Abrahart 2005). An 
evaluation report for the DFID Unemployment Insurance Project notes that the decline in 
UI fund contribution rates has jeopardized public confidence in the program, as UI 
program participation and compliance rates among employers and employees are low 
compared to other social security, pensions, medical, and work injury programs 
(Aschmoneit and Chen 2005).     
While pooling would help strengthen the sustainability of the UI funds overall, the 
level of pooling remains low. The UI system assessment in Liaoning found that each of 
the province’s 14 municipalities has its own arrangements for UI, and only four of them 
have achieved city level pooling. Pooling is complicated by the fact that contributions are 
collected by the various levels of tax office depending on the level of government 
responsible for the particular SOE making the contribution. Financial and administrative 
responsibility rests with the national government in some cases and with provincial, city, 
or district governments in other cases. The Liaoning assessment also found that not only 
are some areas unwilling to subsidize poorer areas at the same level—for example, 
province to province—but they are also unwilling to subsidize poorer areas at a lower 
level within their own region—for example, city to district (Abrahart 2005).   
Obstacles in Program Administration and Coordination   
Chen (2004) cites a number of obstacles to effective UI program implementation 
in Liaoning province. As noted above, the assessment points to the lack of operational 
guidelines or administrative rules. In some cities, the only training handbook and 
operational manual used by UI offices is the 1999 national UI regulations, which tends to 
be too general. Human resource constraints also hinder the ability of local UI offices to 
carry out their duties in helping clients and enforcing eligibility requirements. The 
community UI offices are responsible for monthly benefit eligibility reviews. However, 
many community offices in Liaoning have only two or three staff who are scheduled to 
meet with 50-150 individuals on a reporting date, making it difficult to conduct a 
thorough interview with each person.    
To date, the UI program has had limited interaction with other existing social 
protection programs. Networking among agencies would help improve information on 
beneficiaries as well as facilitate identification of hidden employment. However, no 
information technology has been developed to link the major databases of the different 
agencies together, and limited efforts are made to exchange information.   
Even among the different offices involved in UI administration, the degree of 
coordination appears to be limited in some areas. Chen (2004) notes that coordination 
between the UI benefit administration offices and employment service offices in Liaoning 
remains weak, with no administrative or financial relationship between them. Information 
exchange is limited, and it remains unclear whether employment services offices are 
compiling information on reemployment or whether the information is simply not being 
shared with UI offices. 
Although the use of information technology for overall program management and 
monitoring of eligibility has been limited to date, a growing number of examples 
(including six model cities) proves that technology can be a powerful tool for program 
administration.
12 A review of the model cities found that solid information systems 
helped reduce administrative costs and increase efficiency. In Shanghai, for example, the 
integrated computerized network system on labor and social security has helped facilitate 
information sharing among the municipal, district, and street levels and enabled more 
effective enforcement of eligibility requirements. The collection of regular statistics and 
use of quality indicators also facilitates monitoring of the UI program and allows for 
informed adjustments to implementation as needed.   
4.  IMPROVING THE UI PROGRAM: POLICY CHALLENGES   
Drawing upon the analysis presented above, this section highlights key policy 
challenges and describes possible policy responses. While UI programs across the country 
face different dilemmas and challenges, the key ones are as follows: given the 
unprecedented, rapid changes taking place in the economy and in the labor market in 
particular, what is the vision for the UI program in the long-run—what role should it play 
                                                        
12 Under the DFID-supported Unemployment Insurance Project, representatives from six pilot cities in 
Sichuan and Liaoning provinces conducted study tours to six “model” cities for UI in 2004. The model 
cities were Shanghai, Guangzhou, Qingdao, Foshan, Dalian, and Hangzhou. The cities were selected as best 
practice examples based on the criteria such as: proven improvement in service delivery to the unemployed, 
financial affordability and feasibility of putting the examples into practice, and compliance with the wider 
objectives  of  the  pilot  cities.       
in social protection, and how should it relate to other programs addressing the risk of 
unemployment? How can UI coverage be expanded, and is the objective of providing UI 
to the informal sector a viable one? How should the benefit level be improved? More 
specifically, to enhance the insurance function of the program, can the level of benefits be 
tied to an individual’s pre-unemployment wage level without jeopardizing the program’s 
sustainability? How can the leakages of the UI system be improved? How can 
expenditures on UI benefits be balanced with expenditures on active labor market 
programs so as to maximize incentives to maintain labor market attachment? How can the 
program be financed more efficiently? And finally, how can program administration be 
improved?  
This section discusses each of these challenges in turn. To help guide the policy 
discussion, the conceptual framework that underlies the provision of UI is first presented. 
4.1. Conceptual Framework of Unemployment Insurance   
To help determine the appropriate role for the UI program in a quickly changing 
Chinese economy as well as to help choose among various options in its design, this 
subsection presents the most relevant conceptual underpinnings of the provision of UI. It 
describes the objectives of a UI program, places the program within the general labor 
market risk management framework, and identifies key country factors affecting the 
design and implementation of a UI program. 
Objectives of a UI program   
From the viewpoint of the individual, the objective of a UI program is precisely 
that implied by its name: compensation for income loss due to unemployment. The 
program provides income protection to workers by partly replacing their lost wages with 
social insurance payments. Social insurance mimics market insurance arrangements but 
deviates from actuarial principles. Such payments help cushion the reduction in 
consumption in the wake of job loss—that is, they smooth consumption—and may also 
help alleviate poverty. Viewed from a broader, societal perspective, other objectives of 
the UI program include  encouraging workers to acquire new skills, providing workers 
with the means to conduct more extensive and more effective job searches, redistributing 
income from high- to low-wage earners, and increasing output and efficiency by 
promoting restructuring of enterprises or encouraging workers to accept higher wages and 
thus higher-productivity—but also riskier—jobs.    
Depending on the level of development of the economy and labor market, these 
objectives may vary, and the relative importance of these objectives may also change as 
these circumstances change. For example, in an early stage of introduction, the program 
may offer a low level of benefits and may be used primarily as an anti-poverty tool. With 
economic development, the emphasis may shift to preserving consumption so that the 
program becomes a consumption-smoothing tool by offering a higher level of benefits. 
UI as part of the general labor market risk management framework   
In order to design the UI program appropriately, it should be recognized that there are various 
labor market risk management mechanisms—informal and formal, private and public—and that they 
interact in many important ways. These mechanisms can be divided into three categories: (i) those that 
reduce the risk of unemployment, reducing the probability of becoming unemployed or increasing the 
probability of leaving unemployment if unemployed; (ii) those that mitigate that risk, reducing the 
impact of a future unemployment spell, and (iii) those applied in response to the undesirable event, 
known as coping mechanisms. Within all three categories, informal and formal mechanisms are 
usually available. Formal mechanisms include both market-based and public mechanisms. 
The labor market risk management framework thus enables one to position the UI 
program in the context of other mechanisms that may be used to manage the risk of 
unemployment and thereby allows one to pinpoint diverse interactions that usually exist 
among them. Two types of interactions are particularly important:   
•  Interactions with other policies and programs. Important links exist among public 
policies and programs themselves. The financing of social insurance typically requires 
contributions from both employers and employees, thus creating a wedge between the 
wage received and labor costs. To the extent that this wedge reduces labor demand for 
formal sector workers, the introduction of UI contributes to higher informal 
employment and/or unemployment. Thus, the introduction of a risk mitigation 
mechanism such as social insurance may negatively affect the job creation capacity of 
an economy or increase the unemployment rate, thereby worsening the effectiveness 
of other risk management mechanisms. The interactions and respective roles of 
programs providing protection within firms—such as employment protection rules 
and minimum wages—and programs providing protection outside the firm—such as 
UI, active labor market programs, and social assistance programs—need to be 
examined carefully.  
•  Interactions with private risk management mechanisms. A great variety of such interactions can 
take place, many having important long-term consequences. For example, participation in the UI 
program may increase investments in human capital such as enabling better education of family 
members and improving health and, by providing additional resources, increase the effectiveness 
of job search. However, UI as well as private transfers received by participants may reduce 
participants’ incentives to save or to enroll in training, as well as lower job search and 
reemployment incentives, thus reducing the effectiveness of self-protection measures.   
Design and Implementation Criteria: Accounting for Country-Specific Conditions 
Much is known about the performance of income support programs for the 
unemployed under the conditions that usually prevail in industrial economies. However, 
these conditions may not exist in developing and transition countries. Policymakers in 
those settings need to carefully take account of country-specific features as they introduce 
new institutions or try to improve existing ones. This consideration is particularly 
important for China, where labor market and other conditions are rapidly changing, and 
these changes must be reflected in the design of the UI program. The most important 
country-specific features and links between various risk management mechanisms that 
policymakers need to consider when improving UI programs in developing and transition 
countries are summarized below.   
•  Administrative capacity for program implementation: To monitor continuing 
eligibility effectively, extensive and sophisticated informational requirements are 
needed. Cross-linking of administrative databases helps to identify ineligible benefit 
recipients. 
•  Size of the informal sector: Abundant informal sector employment opportunities not 
only increase the costs of monitoring continuing eligibility of benefit recipients but 
may also render strict monitoring of eligibility counterproductive, as beneficiaries 
may reduce working in the informal sector as a self-protection measure.   
•  Characteristics of unemployment: A UI program is more appropriate if unemployment 
spells are less frequent and longer, since frequent and short spells can be 
self-protected. If unemployment is more prevalent among richer segments of the 
population, then the UI program should not be subsidized, as subsidies may be 
regressive.  
4.2  Key  Policy  Challenges 
What is the long-run vision of the unemployment insurance program?     
With the dramatic changes in the labor market and improvements in other parts of 
the social protection system, it is important to formulate a long-term vision for the UI 
program. As noted above, China has undergone dramatic economic changes in the last 
three decades which have profoundly affected the country’s labor market. Central to these 
changes has been the structural shift from a planned to market economy, with the 
shedding of workers of SOEs and their absorption by the private sector being at the heart 
of the process. Because there are signs that the process of worker reallocation from the 
state to private sector is nearing its completion and the economy is reaching a new, 
dynamic equilibrium which includes a significant number of unemployed workers, both 
the role of the UI system as well as the key design parameters of the program should be 
reconsidered. Although the system of income support for the unemployed itself has 
undergone vast changes, it is time to assess how the current design suits the needs of not 
only today’s but also tomorrow’s society.   
Underscoring the need for a long-term strategy is the fact that in recent years, 
other social protection programs have gained importance. Above all, this fact applies to 
the emergence of the dibao social assistance program in urban areas. Thus, the need to 
delineate respective roles and responsibilities of the UI and dibao programs has emerged. 
In short, while the current UI system has served the purpose well, changes in labor market 
conditions and developments in social protection itself are forcing policymakers to 
consider the long-term role and contours of the UI program.   
In formulating a long-term vision for the UI program, several key policy 
directions seem desirable. First, in line with a major objective of the system, a stronger 
role of UI in providing insurance against the loss of earnings should be considered—that 
is, the consumption-smoothing function of the system should be strengthened, for 
example by introducing earnings-related benefits and by enhancing the ability to pool 
resources of the system. Second, the functions of the system that help ensure continued 
labor force attachment should also be improved, for example through improved 
monitoring of benefit recipients as well as their enhanced participation in effective active 
labor market programs. The implementation of both directions should proceed in parallel 
to ensure that employment disincentives arising from improved consumption smoothing  
are kept in check. Third, the expansion of coverage to formal sector workers should be 
completed. Finally, the respective roles and the relationship of the UI system to other 
parts of social protection programs—in particular, to social assistance and 
enterprise-based benefits such as severance pay—should be clarified and possible 
redundancies eliminated. 
How can UI program coverage be expanded? 
Expanding coverage is one of the biggest challenges of the UI program. The 
primary thrust of this effort should be to bring in formal sector workers who are mandated 
to join the program but who in reality are not enrolled—that is, their contributions to the 
UI program are not paid. At the same, it should be acknowledged that informational and 
enforcement problems make the extension of UI to informal sector workers unfeasible.   
To expand the coverage of formal sector workers, three groups of workers should 
be targeted: workers hired without labor contracts, migrant workers of urban enterprises, 
and workers of rural collective enterprises. Efforts to expand de facto coverage to these 
groups include more rigorous enforcement of contribution requirements among 
employers (see the discussion below on improving UI administration) and outreach and 
information dissemination activities aimed at improving the knowledge of rights among 
workers.
13 Moreover, stricter enforcement of the requirement to hire under labor 
contracts would formalize the employer-employee relationship and thus help expand 
coverage of the UI program. To help migrant workers, inter-provincial benefit 
information systems could be developed to accommodate the needs of workers who 
became unemployed in one city and are looking for employment in another city.   
In the effort to extend coverage to all formal sector workers, attention should be 
given to reducing the UI contribution rates. Indeed, overall social insurance costs pose a 
heavy financial burden and may reduce the job creation capacity of some enterprises 
and/or push workers to the informal sector. With most UI funds enjoying budget 
surpluses,  
                                                        
13  The study of the six model cities, some of which have achieved nearly full UI coverage among the urban 
labor force, showed that they share the common feature of proactive dissemination of information. The 
cities have compiled the relevant UI policies and procedures into free leaflets and published numerous 
brochures in newspapers and other media as well as through the Internet. The materials help answer basic 
questions on labor and social security policies, how to apply for UI benefits, and employment training 
services. These activities have helped boost participation in the UI program, improve contribution 
collection rates, and raise public awareness. 
  
the reduction of contribution rates should be considered, particularly as the prospects of 
continued rapid economic growth persist.   
For informal sector workers, it should be recognized that the option of providing 
UI coverage is not a realistic one, since the standard design of UI is not amenable to their 
coverage. Not only do their uncertain incomes offer little assurance that these workers 
could regularly pay their contributions, but it is also extremely difficult to verify whether 
they fulfill eligibility conditions for the receipt of benefits—for example, to verify the 
reasons for becoming unemployed and their labor market status. While providing other 
types of social protection—above all, old age income protection—for informal sector 
workers is certainly important, large informational problems (moral hazard and adverse 
selection) of UI largely prevent this program from being applied to informal sector 
workers.  
How to set the level, potential duration, and time-structure of benefits? 
Raising the level of UI benefits. As described above, current UI benefit levels 
provide only modest support, and replacement rates are much lower compared to other 
countries. Nonetheless, by exceeding the minimum subsistence level, UI benefits do serve 
their intended purpose of providing workers with basic income security. The unemployed 
with large families also have the option of topping up UI benefits if they meet the 
eligibility criteria.   
Should benefit levels be raised to provide greater protection against lost earnings 
and discourage hidden employment? One positive aspect of having a low benefit level is 
that the low level reduces the moral hazard problem found in UI systems of countries 
with relatively high replacement rates. If benefit levels are perceived to be high, insured 
workers may reduce their efforts at work when employed and reduce their job search 
efforts while unemployed and receiving UI benefits. The low benefit levels in the Chinese 
system help minimize these adverse work incentives, and because the cost of losing 
benefits in moving from unemployment to employment is minimal for most workers, the 
risk of the unemployed falling into the “unemployment trap” is very low. In addition, 
while the current UI system provides only a low degree of consumption smoothing for 
higher-paid and more educated workers, such workers have another type of insurance: 
easy access to jobs thanks to the country’s fast economic growth.  
On the other hand, given that the UI system generates rather low actual 
replacement rates, it could be argued that the UI system should enable recipients to better 
smooth their level of consumption and thus provide an increased level of income security. 
Indeed, the results from recent UI policy simulation pilots in Qingdao and Tianjin suggest 
that such an increase is financially affordable. The simulations show that if the average 
benefit level is increased to 75% (90% in the case of Tianjin) of local minimum wages, 
the UI systems in those areas would continue to be sustainable financially, assuming 
unchanged contribution rates (see simulation results for Tianjin presented in Appendix 2). 
However, an increase in benefit levels carries the risk of worsening reemployment 
incentives, so it would produce best results when introduced in tandem with improved 
enforcement, as discussed below. 
Tying UI benefits to individuals’ pre-unemployment wages (introducing an 
earnings-related benefit structure).  Another way of improving the income protection 
function of the UI system would be to convert current flat benefits to earnings-related 
ones, whereby beneficiaries would receive a certain percentage of their 
pre-unemployment wages. The results from the Qingdao and Tianjin policy simulation 
pilots show that changing the flat benefit structure to one that pays benefits at a 50% 
replacement rate—that is, with benefits being equal to 50% of individuals’ 
pre-unemployment wages—would strongly increase the benefits received by individual 
workers and would therefore have a large impact on the expenses and reserves of the UI 
funds. Nonetheless, simulations for both Tianjin’s and Qingdao’s programs show that the 
increased level of current expenditures is about matched by current revenues, so the 
accumulated balance of UI funds in the years under simulation stays constant (see 
Appendix 2 for Tianjin’s simulations). 
Earnings-related benefit structures thus seem financially feasible, at least for UI 
programs in better financial standing, but they should be carefully planned and based on 
thorough financial projections. To convert to earnings-related benefits, the establishment 
of accurate records of contributions would also be required. As in the case of raising flat 
benefit rates, the effect on reemployment incentives would also need to be assessed for 
workers who would be receiving a higher level of benefits if tied to their contribution 
levels.   
In deciding whether to move away from a flat rate system, one issue to be 
considered is the redistributive impact of the current benefit structure. Although poverty  
reduction is not an explicit objective of the UI system, the flat rate system does have the 
advantage of being more progressive. Since UI benefit levels are flat and do not depend 
on the recipients’ previous wages, the effective replacement rates for low-paid workers 
are higher than for high-paid workers. Furthermore, because workers must contribute 1% 
of their wages to the UI fund, high-paid workers contribute a greater amount to the fund 
than low-paid workers, making the system even more redistributive and progressive in 
nature. The experience of the European transition countries such as Poland and Hungary 
shows that progressive UI benefits can also have strong poverty reduction effects 
(Vodopivec et al 2005). 
Shortening the potential duration of UI benefits. The potential benefit duration of 
China’s UI system is 24 months, exceeding those in other transition countries except 
Slovenia (Table 2). A shorter potential benefit duration would give workers more 
incentive to be proactive in their job search and to find new employment quicker. Notably, 
a recent study on UI in Slovenia suggests that decreasing the potential benefits duration 
increased the likelihood of finding jobs without affecting the quality of 
post-unemployment jobs. After a change in Slovenia’s UI law in 1998 that substantially 
shortened the potential UI benefit duration, job finding rates increased strongly, and the 
quality of post-unemployment jobs remained unaffected in terms of type of contract as 
well as duration and wage of post-employment jobs (Van Ours and Vodopivec 2006).   
Introducing a declining pattern of UI benefits. To improve reemployment 
incentives, the replacement rate could decline with the time spent in unemployment as is 
often the case in European transition countries (Table 2). One possibility would be to 
have a two-teir system, where the benefit would be constant in the first period—for 
example, the first six months—and be reduced later by a certain proportion and remain at 
that level for the remainder of the potential eligibility period. Because the welfare of the 
long-term unemployed may suffer as the reduction of benefits may coincide with the 
depletion of their own savings, introducing a declining pattern of benefits would make 
more sense after the general level is increased, as discussed above.    
Table 2:    Comparison of unemployment insurance parameters between China and other transition countries 
 





Max duration of 
benefits 
Relation to individual's gross 
earnings 
Minimum and maximum benefit levels as 
percent of minimum wage) 
China  
 
1986 None  None    24  months  60-75 % average monthly wage in 
first year, 50% in the second 
None None 
  1993  None  12 months  24 months  None  120%  of  social 
relief payments 
a 
70% regional legal 
minimum wage 
b 
150% of social 
relief payments 
a 
80% regional legal 
minimum wage 
b 
  1999  None  12 months  24 months  None    higher  than  level 
under minimum 
living standards 
scheme for urban 
residents 
lower than local 
minimum wages 
Bulgaria  1998  12 months  9 months  12 months  60%
c 85%  140% 
Czech R.  1998 3  years 
d 12  months  6  months  50% first 6 months 
40% following 6 months 
(60% in case of retraining course) 
none (but 70% of of 
min. living standard 
if not employed 
before) 
150-180% of min. 
living standard 




Flat rate, determined as 60% of 
minimum wage 
  
  2001 
(effective 
2003) 
24 months  12 months    12 months  50% in the first 100 days, 
  of the receipt, 40% thereafter 
40% of the average 
wage 




Table 2:    Comparison of Unemployment Insurance Parameters between China and other Transition Countries (contd.) 
 







Relation to individual's gross 
earnings 
Unemployment benefit levels (minimum 
and maximum, expressed in % of 
minimum wage) 
Hungary  1997 4  years  90  days  360  days  65%
e 90%  of  minimum 
old-age pension 
180% of minimum 
old-age pension 
Latvia  1993      6 months  90% of minimum wage (70% for 
new entrants) 
70 % of minimum 
wage 
140 % of minimum 
wage 
Lithuania  1993      6 months  70 % , later reduced to 60 % and 
50% 
 
Poland  1989 None  None  None  70% first 3 months 
60% following 6 months 
45% after 9 months 
100% average wage 
  1997  18 months  1 year  18 months  flat rate amount paid at 378,2cz  None  none 
Romania  1998  1 year  1 year  9 months
f 50-60%  for  9  months  76-92%  210% 
Slovak R.  1997  3 years  12 months  12 months  60%  first  3  months 
50% following 9 months 
none 150% 
Slovenia  1998  18 months  9-12 months  24 months  70%  first  3  months 
60% following 3 months
o 
100% 300% 
a Before the adoption of the 1995 Labor Law 
b After the adoption of the 1995 Labor Law 
c Average of last six months' wage; an additional 15% is awarded upon completion of a training course. 
d Not required if enrolled in a training course. 
e Unemployed earning from casual work not more than half of the minimum wage per month remain entitled to full UI 
f Some of the unemployment benefit exhaustees (after 9 months) qualify for a support allowance program for an additional (maximum) 18 months. This program is 
means tested, 
and the level of allowance is 60% of the level of unemployment benefit they initially receive. 
Sources: For China, Chen (2004); for transition countries, Vodopivec et al (2005). 
How to reduce leakages of the UI system? 
Stronger enforcement of initial and particularly continuing eligibility 
requirements—above all, job search requirements and availability for work—would help 
eliminate leakages in the UI system and thus improve financial sustainability. As 
described above, reports indicate that a large number of people are engaged in hidden 
employment in the informal sector. It could be argued that the UI fund is bearing a double 
burden from hidden employment: UI funds are being overpaid to ineligible recipients, 
while at the same time individuals receiving income from hidden employment are not 
paying contributions. Greater efforts at enforcement would be particularly important if 
benefits levels are increased, as more resources would be at stake.   
Some progress could be achieved by improved administration of services, for 
example by linking various social security information systems, providing greater 
guidance and specificity regarding job search standards and suitable job offers, and 
strengthening coordination between the UI benefit administration offices and 
reemployment service offices, as discussed below. Particularly in addressing hidden 
employment, a more fundamental issue arises: under the current circumstances of the 
labor market and administrative capacity, should more stringent actions be taken to 
reduce the incidence of hidden unemployment?   
Reducing the number of ineligible beneficiaries could help improve the financial 
sustainability of the system. However, as argued in Vodopivec (2004b), efforts to 
strengthen monitoring of continuing eligibility requirements may be counterproductive at 
this stage of China’s economic development. Particularly if benefits remain at their 
current low levels, stronger enforcement would have limited payoffs and would tax the 
already limited capacity of UI offices. Vodopivec (2004b) notes that unemployment in 
developing countries is more of a “continuous variable” than in developed countries, as 
workers in developing countries have abundant employment opportunities available to 
them in the informal sector and can easily enter and exit the sector. Enforcing continuing 
eligibility requirements would discourage workers from taking informal or temporary 
jobs—engaging in a form of self-protection—and would thus distort reemployment 
incentives. At the same time, because the informal sector is difficult to monitor, trying to 
police hidden unemployment would be very costly. Notably, some central and eastern 
European transition countries allow for a significant “earnings disregard” that allows  
unemployment benefit claimants to maintain their eligibility while earning income up to a 
certain level (Vodopivec et al 2005).   
Further analysis is needed to determine whether and when measures to eliminate 
hidden employment should be strengthened. If benefit levels are raised and the capacity 
of UI offices is improved, enforcement of continuing eligibility requirements will be a 
higher priority. Under these conditions, monitoring would help limit the moral hazard 
problem which could arise from the adoption of higher benefit levels and help ensure 
continued financial sustainability. When monitoring of eligibility requirements is difficult, 
one promising option is to invoke “self-policing” via the introduction of individual 
savings accounts, and to ensure good income protection properties of the system, combine 
self-insurance with social insurance (see Box 1 for an example of Chile’s innovative UI 
system).  
How to improve incentives to maintain labor market attachment?   
A major challenge for the Chinese UI system is to improve incentives to maintain 
a connection to the labor market. How can the system ensure that UI beneficiaries are 
searching for a job?  How can it ensure that they undertake useful and relevant training 
that will help them find a job? What other active labor market programs (ALMPs) should 
they participate in, and what should their timing be? What other services would be useful 
for them, for example participation in job clubs and the help of psychologists? 
Box 1: Combining Self-Insurance and Social Insurance: 
Chile’s New Unemployment Benefit Program 
 
In 2002, Chile introduced an innovative new unemployment insurance program that combines social 
insurance with self-insurance. Unemployment contributions are split between individual accounts and 
a common solidarity account, which is partly financed by the government. Both workers and 
employers pay contributions. By doing so, employers reduce their severance payments obligations. The 
new unemployment insurance program is thus partly replacing severance pay. The program is 
effectively a funded program, with funds of individual accounts managed by a free-standing 
administrator selected through competitive tender. 
 
To stimulate reemployment, the program requires that benefit recipients first draw from their own 
accounts; upon depletion, they can draw from the solidarity fund. Withdrawals from individual 
accounts are triggered by separation from the employer, regardless of the reason. Withdrawals from the 
common fund are triggered once individual accounts are depleted, if the claimant satisfies the usual 
conditions of continuing eligibility under unemployment insurance (i.e. not working, being available, 
searching for job) but are limited to two withdrawals every five years. Benefits are linked to past 
earnings, with a declining schedule. 
 
Source: Vodopivec (2004a).  
A key question in this regard relates to the balance of income support and ALMPs 
that should be provided by the UI fund. While financing expenditures on ALMPs directly 
related to finding a job is justifiable, it should be recognized that there are other 
institutions and funds responsible for the provision of training and vocational education, 
including the training and vocational education of the unemployed.
14 Therefore, 
establishing a threshold for expenditures on ALMPs that can be financed from the UI 
fund is a sensible measure. By the same token, under the current favorable budgetary 
situation of many UI funds, consideration should be given to reducing the UI contribution 
rate rather than increasing spending on training and other ALMPs. 
One important aspect in enhancing the impact of ALMPs is assuring their quality 
and relevance. Chen 2004 found that training courses in Liaoning province often do not 
focus on current labor market needs, nor do the employment centers keep records of 
whether individuals were able to find jobs following the courses. Another problem cited 
in the Liaoning assessment is the disconnect between training benefits and job placement 
services offered. No clear administrative relationship exists between the agencies in 
charge of training and job placement. Many individuals who completed training were not 
referred to job placement service centers afterwards, while job placement centers have 
difficulty finding qualified individuals. Collaboration between the UI program and other 
agencies could not only help improve the impact of training benefits, but it could also 
help smooth the transition for unemployed individuals whose benefits periods expire 
without being able to find new employment and who require additional assistance. In 
addition, it could help facilitate assistance to unemployed individuals who are near 
retirement upon the expiration of benefits and are unlikely to re-enter the labor market. 
Moreover, to help ensure both quality and relevance of training, introducing training 
vouchers which the unemployed could use to purchase services from both public and 
private providers could be considered.
15 
                                                        
14 In principle, using UI fund sources to finance training and other ALMPs for the unemployed is 
appropriate because these services contribute to improving their reemployment chances and thus ultimately 
contribute to the objectives of the UI program. They can also be used as a screening device for UI 
recipients. 
15 Evidence on the impact of training programs shows that, in general, they only mildly improve labor 
market outcomes (probability of reemployment and reemployment wages) and that they are better suited for 
certain groups. For a recent summary, see Betcherman et al.      
The labor market programs in Shanghai provide useful examples for how other 
cities might boost their employment assistance. The Shanghai government has played an 
important role in employment assistance, such as buying in training and employment 
services, providing public posts for job seekers, and implementing large-scale 
employment assistance projects such as a job placement scheme for 10,000 workers. The 
vocational training offered by the municipal labor and social security departments focuses 
on relatively advanced skills such as auto and elevator maintenance and garments 
processing. In Guangzhou, the Zero Employee Household Assistance project mobilizes 
employers to provide at least one post for families in which no one has a job. The model 
cities also provide subsidies to the employment service centers for assisting the 
unemployed. Some countries such as Bulgaria and the Czech Republic even reward those 
beneficiaries who attend or complete training courses with special awards (Vodopivec et 
al 2005). 
Following the practice in other countries, criteria for demonstrating attachment to 
the labor market, such as registration with the employment service or employer contacts 
on a regular basis, could be introduced as conditions for continued eligibility. Establishing 
such criteria, however, requires intimate knowledge of local conditions, and arguments 
for and against must be carefully considered before introducing them.   
How to finance the program more efficiently? 
As described above, the financial situation of the UI program has improved 
considerably, with an overall fund surplus. This situation is very different from the past 
experience of many UI funds and warrants careful scrutiny. While the surpluses of UI 
funds could be used for a number of purposes including spending on active labor market 
programs, one option that should be considered seriously is a reduction of the UI 
contribution rate. Under a situation of high social security burdens, reducing the UI 
contribution rate would help decrease the reluctance of employers to join the program and 
thus help expand coverage. The reduction of labor costs would also help generate 
additional employment. 
Easing of the financial situation of UI funds, coupled with appropriate policy 
measures, will also help achieve another highly desirable objective: shifting pooling to a 
higher level. Indeed, it can be argued that with the ever-increasing mobility of the 
workforce and to facilitate rural-urban migration, it is the provincial level that provides  
the necessary pooling of funds. This pooling will prevent areas with high unemployment 
from facing insolvency in their UI funds and paying low UI benefits. As an incentive for 
pooling, provincial-level adjustment funds could be given only to those municipalities 
who have achieved single pools. Incentives for higher-level pooling should also be 
explored. Currently, only Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai have provincial-level pooling. 
Other measures to help ensure the continued financial sustainability of UI funds 
include better enforcement of eligibility requirements (see the discussion of program 
administration below), as well as policy changes such as shortening of the potential 
benefit duration. 
How can program administration be improved? 
The rapidly changing conditions of the labor market as well as the evolving 
functions of the UI program itself provide a constant challenge for program 
administration. This section discusses possible improvements in enforcing contribution 
collection and the fulfillment of eligibility conditions, as well as integration of social 
insurance collection. 
Contribution collection. More rigorous enforcement of contribution collection 
among employers who are mandated to pay would help improve UI program coverage as 
well as improve revenue collection. Cities such as Shanghai and Foshan, which have 
adopted strict measures for collecting UI contributions, provide useful examples in this 
regard. The base amount of contribution is determined at the beginning of each year and 
is monitored throughout the year. Special auditing is conducted, and employers who have 
not contributed to UI or who have made insufficient contributions are given a notice of 
correction. Any payment arrears are disclosed to the public, and organizations with large 
arrears are exposed in the media or taken to court for enforcement. At the same time, 
enterprises that have been contributing actively are reported in the media in a timely 
manner to set a good example for other organizations. As a result, Shanghai and Foshan 
have extremely high contribution rates at 99.7% and 99%, respectively.   
Enforcement of eligibility conditions. To improve eligibility enforcement, greater 
guidance and specificity could be given in the requirements for initial and continued 
eligibility. In the case of refusing jobs for “proper causes,” UI systems in other countries 
offer examples of how proper causes might be defined, such as a certain percentage gap 
between the salary of the referred job and the individual’s salary in the previous job,  
mismatch with prior training and experience, and distance of available work from the 
individual’s residence. Such examples could serve as inputs into the development of 
operational guidelines that would help UI offices carry out their enforcement duties more 
effectively.   
Following the practice in other countries, criteria for demonstrating attachment to 
the labor market, such as registration with the employment service or employer contacts 
on a regular basis, could be introduced as conditions for continued eligibility. In best 
practice cities such as Shanghai, unemployed individuals are required to seek work at the 
employment service center at least twice a month with their unemployment certificate and 
UI benefit approval certificate. Workers are also required to attend at least two training 
courses. If an unemployed person has not sought a job at least twice a month or has not 
attended training courses, UI benefits are terminated. Such measures have resulted in 
improvements in UI benefits administration as well as helped reduce benefit leakages to 
workers engaged in hidden unemployment, as they are unable to meet the job seeking and 
training requirements while working. 
Modern information systems can also be powerful tools for checking benefit 
eligibility. Shanghai has been highly effective in using its computerized management 
information system to confirm whether an individual is eligible for UI benefits. When a 
person applies for benefits, the computerized system automatically searches for relevant 
information on the applicant such as employment status, age, and remaining entitlement 
period for UI benefits. People who are employed, receiving pensions, or at retirement age 
are denied benefits.
16  
Better coordination between the UI benefit administration offices and 
reemployment service offices would also help facilitate the enforcement of continued 
eligibility requirements. For example, if an employment service office refers a UI 
beneficiary to a job and the individual refuses to take the job without proper reasons, the 
refusal should be reported to the UI benefits office. Horizontal integration of databases or 
the development of other mechanisms for sharing information across the relevant social 
protection programs would strengthen enforcement further. In particular, stronger 
linkages with social insurance agencies and the civil affairs department, which is in 
                                                        
16 Special inter-provincial benefit information systems could be developed to accommodate workers who 
become unemployed in one city and are looking for employment in another city. A harmonized information 
technology system could be used to help facilitate the filing as well as benefit claim process.  
charge of the urban minimum living allowance program, would provide better 
information on beneficiaries. However, the development of such information sharing 
systems would require unified planning and design as well as a sizeable initial 
investment. 
Integrating social insurance contribution collection. An important area for 
improvement is the integration of contribution collection of the UI fund with other types 
of social insurance. For example, in Guangzhou and Foshan, contributions for pension, 
health insurance, UI, maternity benefits, and industrial injury are collected together. This 
integration not only helps improve UI fund collection but could also promote the 
expansion of UI coverage. It also reduces administrative costs among social insurance 
agencies and increases service efficiency. Close coordination of departments is a 
prerequisite for integrated fund collection to work, and special attention is needed to 
ensure that UI funds are not consumed by other large programs such as pensions or health 
insurance. 
How to coordinate UI and severance pay programs? 
Some unemployment benefits recipients may also have received compensation 
from their employers in the form of severance pay, and Giles et al (2006) report that these 
payments (paid as lump sums) are quite substantial.
17  Given that these two programs – 
unemployment insurance and severance pay – serve a similar purpose, it would make 
sense to coordinate the two programs.
18 One possibility that minimally affects income 
protection is to postpone payments of UI benefits in cases when UI beneficiaries have 
already received the severance pay associated with the current episode of unemployment.   
The postponement could be, for example, for 3 months, or for a period proportional to the 
number of monthly wages received by the worker in the form of severance pay. Instead of 
the postponement, a reduction of potential UI benefit duration could also be considered.   
                                                        
17  According to the Regulation of Economic Compensation due to Labor Contract Violation or Termination 
(Lao Bu Fa [1994] No.481), employers should pay workers whose contracts are being terminated a 
lump-sum severance pay amounting to one monthly way per year of service with the employer, up to a 
maximum of 12 monthly wages (no maximum is mandated for workers who are unable to reemploy 
following illness or injury). 
18  Both programs aim to provide the worker a compensation for the loss of his or her job. It could be argued, 
however, that while UI benefits primary role is to smooth consumption during the ensuing period of 
unemployment, severance pay, in addition, provides a compensation for the reduction of wages in 
post-unemployment jobs due to the loss of firm-specific capital (see Vodopivec 2004a).  
5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Responding to the need to promote efficiency-enhancing changes in a labor market which 
created massive worker redundancies and dislocations, China has been experimenting 
with its unemployment insurance system in the last two decades. The system prevailing 
since 1999 has worked reasonably well: the current “no frills” system offers modest, yet 
important, protection against lost earnings while minimizing (re)employment 
disincentives. By exceeding the minimum subsistence level, the benefits do maintain the 
basic living standard of the unemployed. Due to weak enforcement, the unemployed 
typically collect UI benefits for the maximum duration and many of them are 
simultaneously working in the informal economy, thus topping up the benefits with 
occasional earnings. However, the same features of the model—parsimony and weak 
monitoring of informal employment—can also be credited for leaving reemployment 
incentives virtually unchanged. Lax monitoring does not prevent recipients from taking 
occasional jobs, and the low level of benefits poses little hindrance to taking regular jobs.   
While the system seems to work reasonably well and fits the current stage of 
development of the Chinese economy, it could be improved in several ways. In the short 
term, these measures would include: more rigorous enforcement of contribution 
collection and awareness raising to increase UI program coverage; raising the level of 
benefits to ensure more adequate income protection; improving information systems as 
well as introducing specific operational guidelines about the enforcement of eligibility 
requirements to reduce leakages in the UI system; and improving the link to active labor 
market programs to improve incentives to maintain labor market attachment. The 
introduction of these measures, combined by improved pooling of resources, should also 
help ensure the continued financial sustainability of the UI system. 
In the medium and long term, the policy challenges are even more demanding and 
complex. Expanding UI coverage may require the introduction of subsidized, defined 
contribution-based individual savings accounts, with the possibility of joint coverage of 
old age income support, disability, survivorship, as well as unemployment. Improving the 
consumption smoothing properties of the UI system will almost certainly require the 
transition from a flat rate benefit to a benefit which replaces a certain percentage of 
individual’s earnings, which will be even more important if the current unprecedented 
high growth period of the Chinese economy comes to an end. More sophisticated ways of  
reducing leakages of the UI system will also need to be explored, for example by 
introducing a system combining self- and social insurance, linking information systems 
on formal employment and cash benefits, and improving enforcement of initial and 
continuing eligibility requirements. Finally, UI benefits will have to be better coordinated 
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Appendix 1: How recipients of unemployment benefit exit from unemployment – 
evidence from Qingdao municipality UI program 
 
To learn about the pattern of exit from unemployment by recipients of unemployment 
insurance (UI) benefits, an analysis was conducted of the information on registered 
unemployed obtained from the Employment office of Qingdao municipality. This analysis 
could suggest possible leakages of the program and disincentive (moral hazard) effects 
created by the UI program. Particular attention was paid to (i) the comparison of exit patterns 
between recipients of UI benefit and non-recipients; (ii) the comparison of exit patterns 
among groups of benefit recipients who are entitled to different potential benefit durations, 
and (iii) the probability of exit from unemployment around the scheduled end of eligibility 
for UI benefits. 
 
Description of Data 
 
The dataset consists of unemployment records of all persons who registered as unemployed 
with the Employment office of Qingdao municipality during January 1-December 31, 2004. 
The unemployment records of 49,071 individuals were analyzed, of which there were 27,450 
recipients of UI benefits and 21,621 who did not qualify for the benefits (see Table A1).
19 
For each unemployment spell, the following information was available: date of birth, 
education level, marital status, date of registration with the office, end of employment if 
previously employed, and the start of (re)employment if job was taken by the time of 
information gathering (by March 2007). For those who qualified for unemployment benefits, 
information about the entitlement period start and end dates, as well as the date of the end of 
the actual receipt of the benefit (if existed) was also provided. The qualifying period of 
calendar year of 2004 was chosen so that by the time of data collection, all individuals 
selected in the sample faced at least a two-year observation horizon—the horizon needed to 
investigate the complete effects of unemployment benefits for the group with the longest 




The results of both the non-parametric (graphic) analysis as well as the results of econometric 
estimation of duration models are reported below.   
 
Graphic analysis.  A possible association between UI and duration of unemployment is 
studied by comparing survival functions of different groups of the unemployed. The 
Kaplan-Meier survival functions were used, showing the probability of being unemployed at 
a given duration of unemployment spell (exits from unemployment to non-employment are 
treated as censored observations, together with true censored observations). 
 
                                                        
19 The number of observations provided by the Qingdao office was 53,043. In the analysis, only individuals 
who started the full eligibility cycle (and thus could be classified in various groups by potential benefit duration) 
were retained. The ones who re-entered unemployment to claim residual benefits from the previous 
unemployment spell were dropped.  
Table A1: Number of Recipients and non-recipients, by Age and Education Level 
 
  Total Average 
age 
Education level (percent) 




TOTAL  49071  37.4  26.2  22.3 22.5 29.1 
Non-recipients  21621  36.4  23.4  21.5 21.3 33.8 
Recipients – total  27450  38.1  28.3  23.0  23.4  25.3 
PBD of 3 months  2672  30.9  12.0  34.3  14.8  38.9 
PBD of 6 months  1977  32.4  15.9  32.6  15.9  35.6 
PBD of 9 months  1557  31.9  13.9  29.4  16.2  40.5 
PBD of 12 months  1311  33.1  17.1  33.3  15.8  33.8 
PBD of 15 months  163  38.1  14.7  28.2  23.9  33.1 
PBD of 18 months  4784  34.4  20.7  30.6  19.3  29.4 
PBD of 24 months  14986  42.5  38.0  15.6  28.6  17.8 
Source: Own computations based on data Qingdao Employment Office data. 
* PBD - Potential benefit duration 
  
Figure A1 shows a systematic difference between the survival functions of recipients of 
unemployment benefits and non-recipients. As the duration of unemployment spells 
progresses, the proportion of individuals who stay unemployed (that is, of those who have 
not left unemployment to take a job) is much larger among benefit recipients than among 
non-recipients. For example, 10 months into the unemployment spell, 62% of recipients are 
still unemployed, compared to 38% of non-recipients. Note, however, that it may be the 
differences in personal characteristics—rather than employment disincentives—that are the 
reason for the observed difference in exit from unemployment. As shown in Table A1, 
non-recipients are on average more educated, and such workers typically have better chances 
of finding a job (which is the case with Qingdao unemployed, as well—see below).   
 
Another way to detect possible disincentives is to compare survival in unemployment of 
groups of recipients categorized by their potential benefit duration. Figure 1 in the main text 
plots a survival function for seven groups of workers: those with 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, and 24 
months of potential duration, respectively. The figure discerns two notable patterns. First, the 
longer the potential duration, the longer the survival in unemployment. This pattern is 
systematic (except at the very beginning) and persists throughout the observation period of 
24 months. Second, survival functions of all groups of recipients exhibit substantial decline 
within the month of eligibility exhaustion and the preceding month. 
 
What do the above observations imply?    While they are suggestive of waiting behavior and 
leakages, again there may be other plausible explanations, at least for some of the observed 
behavior. The latter applies to the systematic differences in survivor function among groups 
with different potential benefit duration: while these differences are consistent with the 
"waiting" behavior, they may also reflect reduced education levels of groups with longer 
potential durations. Indeed, as shown in Table A1, groups with longer potential benefit 
duration are systematically less educated (for example, the percent of unemployed with  
university education systematically declines for groups with 12 months of PBD and longer), 
and as in Figure A1, this may again may be the reason for observed difference in exit from 
unemployment.   
  
Figure A1: Survival Function of the Unemployed who Registered at Qingdao 
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Source: Own computations based on data Qingdao Employment Office data. 
 
More suggestive evidence of "waiting" behavior comes from the other observed pattern of 
survival functions, the fact that survival functions of all groups of workers exhibit substantial 
decline exactly at the point of exhaustion of eligibility, a peculiar pattern that cannot be easily 
explained by other factors. The proportion of benefit recipients whose exit from 
unemployment occurred around the exhaustion of the benefit is fairly large: 39% exited 
within a month from the end of eligibility and an additional 13% in the preceding month.     
   
Econometric analysis. To shed more light on determinants of exit from unemployment, the 
results of a parametric approach to address this issue are presented below. The focus is on 
estimating the probability that an individual moves from unemployment to employment. If   
the individual has already been in state i for t periods, the probability that he or she leaves 
that state at time t, λ(t), can be specified as: 
 
  λ(t)  =  f(t)/S(t)            
 
where λ(t) is the hazard function, S(t) = [1 - F(t)] is the survivor function, F(t) = Pr(T<t) 
specifies the probability distribution that random variable T is less than some value t, and f(t) 
is the corresponding density function. The hazard depends on how long the individual has  
been in state i, on the characteristics of individuals in that state, and on environment (state of 
the economy, for example). One possibility is to use a semi-parametric, Cox proportional 
hazard model, with the functional form of the hazard specified as follows: 
 
  λ (t,X) =    λ0(t)exp[X(t)β] ,              
 
where λ 0 is the "baseline" hazard, and X(t) is a set of explanatory  variables—covariates.    
  
The econometric results confirm the results obtained above by the graphic analysis, and they 
also provide additional insights. Above all, the highly significant parameters of group 
identification dummies confirm the disincentives effects of the receipt of unemployment 
insurance, the effects which increase with the potential benefit duration (Table A2). Namely, 
for groups with potential benefit duration (PBD) over 3 months, the hazard ratios are 
significant and progressively smaller than one, indicating decreasing probability of exit from 
unemployment. Interestingly, the disincentive effects for the group with PBD of 3 months 
(captured in the “intercept” variable “Receiving unemployment benefits”) are not significant, 
as the hazard of exit for this group does not differ from the hazard of exit for non-recipients. 
These coefficients are free of the impact of the composition of various PBD groups, as these 
are captured by other variables in the estimated model. 
 
Other results are also of interest. First, the more educated have a significant advantage over 
less educated workers, with the university degree, in particularly, strongly increasing the 
chances of getting a job. Second, the success rates in job finding worsen with age. Workers in 
their twenties have significant advantages over those in their thirties and their forties, but 
surprisingly not over those in their fifties (the latter finding requires further investigation). In 
comparison to married workers, single workers face more difficulties in finding a job, a result 
that may be attributed to higher reservation wages they may have. 
  







Potential benefit duration (compared to PBD of 3 months) 
  
PBD of 6 or 9 months  0.771**  0.028 
PBD of 12 or 15 months  0.684**  0.032 
PBD of 18 months  0.693**  0.024 
PBD of 18 months  0.614**  0.020 
 
Receiving unemployment benefits     
 Yes  0.963  0.029 
    
Education (compared to elementary)     
Elementary   1.045*  0.021 
High school    1.037*  0.019 
University 1.461**  0.027 
 
Age (compared to 29 and below)     
Age 30-39  0.771*  0.016 
Age 40-49  0.814*  0.020 
Age 50 or over  1.017  0.030 
 
Marital status (compared to married) 
  
Single ( and other)  0.938**  0.018 
Log  likelihood  =   -267,224     
No. of observations: 44,390     
**Significant at 1 percent level, and * significant at 5 percent level 
 
  
Appendix 2: Simulations of Unemployment Insurance Program of Tianjin Municipality   
 
This appendix presents the simulation results of increasing the level and changing the 
structure of benefits offered by the unemployment insurance (UI) program of Tianjin 
municipality. 
 
The simulations are produced by the UISIM, a simulation model developed by the World 
Bank to help policymakers make projections of UI benefit costs, contributions, and trust fund 
balances, to be able to evaluate the financial flows implied by the system and assess its 
financial soundness. The UISIM model for Tianjin municipality’s program was constructed 
by the Tianjin municipal authority as part of the World Bank-sponsored project to simulate 
financial flows of UI systems in selected provinces and municipalities. 
 
Macroeconomic data used in simulations were obtained from the Tianjin Yearbook. The data 
on the design parameters of the UI system, the characteristics of the beneficiaries, and their 
benefit levels were obtained from the Municipal Statistical Bureau, Municipal Labor and 




Three simulation scenarios of the Tianjin municipality UI program are presented below: a 
baseline scenario and two alternative scenarios. The baseline scenario assumes that the key 
conditions and parameters of the program will remain unchanged in the future, and the two 
alternative scenarios assume specific changes in the level and structure of the UI system. 
Under the alternative scenarios, only one parameter is modified while others retain their 
baseline values. Alternative scenarios assume historical values until December 2004 and 
introduce deviations from these values starting January 2005. The following alternative 
scenarios are distinguished: 
 
(1) Baseline scenario, which assumes that historical values of the Tianjin municipality UI 
program prevail in the indefinite future. In particular, it assumes that the following  key 
characteristics and parameters remain at their 2004 levels (average 2004 values for flows, 
and December 2004 values for stocks): 
•  the level and duration of benefits, as well as eligibility conditions for their receipt; 
•  the number, age, and gender structure of the benefit recipients, 
•  the distribution by the length of stay in unemployment of benefit recipients; 
•  the number and structure of contributors by age and gender, as well as their structure 
of wages; and 
•  the contribution rates. 
 
(2) Increase-of-benefits scenario, where the level of benefits is increased to 90% of the 
minimum wage (from the prevailing level of 300-333 yuan to 432 yuan).   
  
(3) Earnings-related benefits scenario, where the structure of benefits is assumed to change 
from the prevailing flat-fee structure to earnings-related benefit regime, a regime where the 




The projected evolution of revenues, expenditures, and UI reserve funds is presented below 
for the simulation years of 2005-2008 (see Figures A2 and A3): 
 
y  Under the baseline scenario, the revenue of the unemployment insurance fund will 
exceed its expenditure, with the resulting surplus increasing in the years under 
simulation, thus contributing to a large accumulation of funds.   
y  Under the increase-of-benefits scenario, the level of UI benefits would increase, but 
it would still lag behind the revenues collected in each period, leaving significant 
surpluses and leading to accumulation of resources nearly as fast as under the 
baseline scenario.   
y  Under the earnings-related benefits scenario, the change of structure of benefits 
increases substantially the level of benefits received by individual workers, and as 
seen in Figure A2, the projected overall UI expenditures strongly increase. 
Nonetheless, for the projected years, the increased level of current expenditures is 
about matched by current revenues and consequently, the accumulated balance of UI 
fund in the years under simulation stay constant. This contrasts with the strong 
increase of the fund reserves under the baseline and increase-of-benefits scenarios 
(Figure A3). 
 
Figure A2: Simulation of Expenditures on UI Benefits and UI Fund Reserves under the   




Source: UISIM projections for Tianjin municipality’s UI program, based on Tianjin municipal authority report (2006). 
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Figure A3: Simulation of UI Fund Reserves under the Baseline, Increase-of-benefits, 
and Earnings-related Benefits Scenarios, 2005-08 
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Source: UISIM projections for Tianjin municipality’s UI program, based on Tianjin municipal authority report (2006). 
Note: UI fund reserves are presented as the number of months for which the current level of benefits could be paid by the reserve fund 
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Summary Findings
Responding to the need to promote efficiency-enhancing changes in
the labor market, China has been experimenting with an unemployment
insurance (UI) program over the last two decades. This paper reviews
recent labor market developments, describes the evolution of the UI
program, and assesses the working of the UI program by analyzing its
coverage, level of benefits, work incentives, provision of employment
services, and financial performance. Among others, the paper uses UI
program simulations for the Qingdao and Tianjin municipalities, and
analyzes survival in unemployment of UI beneficiaries using individual
level data from Qingdao. The paper finds that the current “no frills”
program - the program that offers modest, yet important, protection
against lost earnings while minimizing (re)employment disincentives -
works reasonably well and fits the current stage of development of the
Chinese economy. The paper concludes by identifying key challenges
of the program and exploring possible policy responses to these
challenges in both the short- and long-term.
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